1 The National Association of State Workforce Agencies (NASWA) conducted a survey of state unemployment insurance job search policies in 2003. They received responses from all 50 states and two other jurisdictions, the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico; the survey did not include the Virgin Islands, which also has an unemployment insurance program. All 53 of these jurisdictions will be called "states" in this article. The full report on this survey is Christopher J. O'Leary. 2004 . "UI Work Search Rules and Their Effect on Employment," prepared for the Center for Employment Security Education and Research. Washington, DC: NASWA (February). <http://www.workforceatm.org/sections/pdf/ 2004/UI_Work_Search.pdf>. Accessed April 22, 2005. 2 Entitled duration of regular benefits can be as long as 30 weeks in both Massachusetts and Washington state depending on recent employment and earnings.
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I. BACKGROUND
Ever since the federal-state unemployment insurance (UI) system was implemented following enactment of the Social Security Act in 1935, reemployment of claimants has been an important emphasis of the program. This paper examines whether UI requirements for job search and mechanisms connecting UI claimants with reemployment services tend to shorten insured unemployment durations. We summarize evidence from a 2003 survey of all state UI programs conducted by the National Association of State Workforce Agencies (NASWA). 1 We also present existing research evidence about the effect of job search policies and interventions on the duration of insured unemployment. While the size of the estimated impacts differ, the consistent finding is that both UI work search requirements and reemployment services tend to shorten insured unemployment durations by speeding return to work.
There is significant variation across the states in many aspects of UI program design. All state UI programs provide partial wage replacement to eligible claimants for a period up to six months to workers who become unemployed through no fault of their own. 2 State rules establish initial eligibility conditions defining acceptable conditions for job separation and the degree of prior labor force attachment. Workers who quit their jobs or who were justly dismissed for cause are normally denied initial eligibility for benefits. To continue collecting jobless compensation, UI claimants who do initially qualify for benefits must demonstrate on a week-to-week basis that they 3 The consensus estimate is that a 10 percent increase in the wage replacement rate provided by UI would increase the insured duration of joblessness by about one week. For a summary of research on this issue see Paul T. Decker. 1997. "Work Incentives and Disincentives," UI as social insurance includes elements common to both private insurance and social welfare. For the risk of unemployment to be insurable, the loss of employment must be an unavoidable event. To maintain the insurance character of the UI program, workers who voluntarily separate from employment are denied initial eligibility for cash benefits. Monitoring to ensure that job separations were involuntary and an active search for work is pursued reduces a potential insurance problem of "moral hazard," wherein the insured person controls the risk of exposure to occurrence of the event insured against.
UI is a national program operated by the states under federal administrative requirements.
The UI program pays benefits to a substantial minority of unemployed workers, and benefits are large enough to have an effect on their reemployment behavior.
3 For fiscal year 2006, it is expected that 9 million beneficiaries will collect over $37 billion in benefits, with an average duration of more 11-13, 2005. 3 that time states have dramatically increased the extent to which they take initial and continued claims over the telephone and through the Internet. The switch from one-on-one in person claims taking in employment security offices reduces the chance that UI claimants will be quickly involved in reemployment services at one-stop centers. Additionally, the number of states that systematically review work search activity and refer UI claimants to reemployment services through eligibility review programs (ERPs) has declined over time.
Two institutional changes have operated to counter the distancing from reemployment services resulting from technological change in claims administration. The Worker Profiling and Reemployment Services (WPRS) system, established by a 1993 federal law, requires states to refer UI claimants at risk of long-term joblessness to mandatory reemployment services. The Workforce Investment Act (WIA) of 1998 established one-stop centers that provide universal access to core and intensive reemployment services.
Labor market conditions have also changed substantially in the last decade. Workers who are designated by their separating employer as likely to be recalled to work are usually excused from the work search requirement, and they are not referred to reemployment services. However, the proportion of UI claimants who are on permanent layoff has increased dramatically, while the share on temporary layoff expecting recall has diminished. The proportion of permanent layoffs among the insured unemployed has increased from 0.451 in the 1970s to 0.489 in the 1990s, while the proportion on temporary layoff has declined from 0.141in the 1970s to 0.138 in the 1990s. 4 Since 2001 the majority of unemployed job losers have been permanently separated from their prior employers. This fact partly explains why UI claimants now have longer unemployment durations.
It also increases the potential benefit of work search requirements and reemployment services to get UI beneficiaries back to work more quickly.
II. JOB SEARCH RULES AND REEMPLOYMENT SERVICES
The 2003 NASWA survey of state employment security agencies covered the following seven topics: 1) the current method of taking initial and continued UI claims, 2) the method of administering the UI work test, 3) the requirements for demonstrating an active job search, 4)
reasons UI claimants are excused from the work search requirement, 5) the requirements for job search contacts with employers, 6) the method of validating active work search and identifying cases where suitable work is refused, and 7) the method of connecting UI beneficiaries with reemployment services. We will examine each in turn.
Throughout the history of the UI program, there has been a strong focus on reemployment.
The UI work test has been a critical component of the reemployment process. The work test normally requires both initial job registration with the public employment service and ongoing weekly job search contacts with potential employers. The work test depends upon a series of rules that are embodied in state laws and administrative rules, and the methods and technology used to take UI claims. Table   1 ). Once initially eligible, to continue collecting weekly UI benefits claimants must be able, available, and actively seeking work. In practice, being able to work is demonstrated in most cases by the filing of a UI claim and registration for work with the public employment service (PES). In the past, claims takers could make an assessment of ability to work when they met with a claimant face-to-face. The same can not be done today with telephone or Internet claims. Availability for work means being ready, willing, and able to work. Registration for job search at the public employment service also provides some evidence of work availability.
The requirement for actively seeking work calls for action beyond job search registration.
All states except Pennsylvania, require by statute or administrative rule that claimants be seeking work or making a reasonable effort to find work. Pennsylvania only requires that workers be able and available for suitable work. Ten states require active seeking of work by administrative rule only: Alaska, Arizona, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, New York, Puerto Rico, South Dakota, Tennessee, and Texas. Nearly all states waive the work search requirement for workers on temporary layoff with a definite recall date in the near future. Some states specify how soon the recall date must be to waive the requirement. This waiver has been an essential part of the UI program since it was established in 1935, allowing employers to retain their skilled workers during short layoffs, until demand for the firms' products returns and the workers can be rehired. Thus, UI is not intended to break, but rather to preserve, existing employer-worker relationships.
Workers who find their jobs through union hiring halls are also commonly excluded from the work search requirement. These workers are not expected to search for work independently as long as they are registered with the placement service of their union hiring hall.
Workers are also excluded from the work search requirement for weeks during which they are enrolled in training approved by the state UI agency. States are required by federal UI law to have an exemption from the work search requirement for training in their state UI law, as a way to encourage participation in training.
Taken together, the exemptions for participation in training and for seeking work through union hiring halls affect only a small fraction of UI beneficiaries. The exemption for having a definite recall date affects a much greater share of claimants, but it appears to be declining in importance in recent decades as more workers losing their jobs are on permanent layoff and smaller proportions are subject to recall.
State UI programs can assure continuous search for work by instituting formal requirements for making contacts with potential employers each week. States have moved away from strict numerical requirements for contacts; only about 30 percent of states require one or more contacts per week. This decline is in part because employers do not want repetitive and burdensome employment applications that are filed, in part, to meet the UI work search requirements. However, more vague requirements make it more difficult to assess whether the state is enforcing this requirement under the UI quality control program. 8 Instead of a fixed number of employer contacts, the most common rule now is to make a number of employer contacts each week that is "customary for the occupation." Such a standard is difficult to enforce. Another common form of the rule requires "reasonable and diligent" job search. JSA identified in responses to the NASWA questionnaire was WIA "core" services provided to workers at one-stop career centers, including labor market information, job referrals, resume preparation assistance, and interviewing skills training.
The only two systematic approaches to promoting reemployment mentioned in state responses to the survey were WPRS and ERP. Given that WPRS serves a small portion of UI claimants and ERPs are only provided in a small number of states, the systematic connection of UI beneficiaries with job search assistance is rather weak. That being said, a considerable portion of UI beneficiaries receive reemployment services in the form of core and "intensive" services in onestop career centers, whether because they seek services on their own or because they register with the public employment service. The extent of the receipt of reemployment services is explored in the next section.
III. USE OF CORE AND INTENSIVE SERVICES BY UI CLAIMANTS
A sizeable share of UI claimants receive some reemployment services from the workforce development system's one-stop centers. For example, during program year (PY) 1999, across the United States, PES had 16.7 million registrants, of whom 6.2 million were UI claimants. Of the 6.2 million UI claimants who registered with the PES, 55.4 percent received some reportable service.
Among those receiving services the most popular were referral to a job interview (48 percent) and JSA (71 percent). The observed usage rate for JSA is enhanced by the compulsory participation for WPRS referrals. Other core and intensive services are also popular; however, only 3.6 percent of PES registrants and 5.1 percent of UI beneficiaries were referred to job skills training (see Table 2 ).
Viewed another way, a substantial minority of UI claimants receive some reportable PES services.
Among the 6.72 million UI beneficiaries in PY 1999, a majority received a reportable service.
The usage of reemployment services by UI beneficiaries can be better appreciated by examining the specific types of services received. Tables 3 and 4 provide information about the core and intensive services that were provided by the Georgia Department of Labor during PY 2000. Of the 254,030 total Georgia UI clients that year, 75 percent (190, 705) received at least one core service. The most frequently provided core services were specific labor market information, help searching for a job order, and referral to a job interview.
Many fewer Georgia UI clients received intensive services: 56,340, or 22 percent of all clients. The most frequently provided of these services were counseling and development of customer service plans; each of these services were provided to nearly one-fifth of UI clients. No other intensive services were provided to more than 2 percent of UI clients. As shown in Table 4 , the share of UI beneficiaries referred to training was just over 3 percent.
IV. EFFECTS OF RULES AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES ON INSURED UNEMPLOYMENT DURATIONS
The reemployment services most frequently provided to UI clients are job interview referrals and JSA. This section examines evidence on the effectiveness of reemployment services and work search requirements in promoting return to work. Evaluations of job search services for UI claimants have focused on three main topics: job interview referrals, JSA, and targeted JSA. 9 The major studies on each of these three topics are summarized separately in Tables 5, 6 , and 7. Each of the evaluations used a distinct research design, and some satisfied higher methodological standards than others. Impact estimates differ across the studies because of varieties of methodologies, samples, and time frames used for analysis. Nonetheless, each of the studies adds to our knowledge about the effectiveness of public labor exchange services in the United States.
Taken together, evidence from these studies has helped shape the direction of policy regarding both the UI work test and the public labor exchange in the United States. Research has guided the development of programs for dislocated workers, targeted job search assistance, and institutions for coordination of services. These include the establishment of the WPRS system, onestop career centers, and state ERPs as part of the UI work test that is administered by UI and onestop career center staff.
The estimated effects of job interview referrals are summarized in Table 5 . Johnson et al. (1993) , in the first national evaluation of the PES in the United States, found that job referrals are most effective for women but are also effective for men over 45 years of age and men in urban areas-providing evidence for delivering job placement services to middle-aged, dislocated workers (Johnson et al. 1983; Johnson, Dickinson, and West 1985) .
A study by Arnold Katz (1991) of PES effectiveness for dislocated workers in Pennsylvania found JSA to be most effective early in a spell of joblessness. The study also found that PES job referrals act as a backstop once job seekers exhaust other avenues of search-evidence that would favor early JSA intervention to dislocated workers-a policy embodied in the WPRS system.
An evaluation by Jacobson and Petta (2000) A field experiment in Tacoma, Washington, reported on by Johnson and Klepinger (1991, 1994) , found that eliminating both continued-claim filing and the work test leads to dramatically longer spells of compensated joblessness-providing further examples of the importance of UI and PES cooperation in requiring and monitoring job search activity (Johnson and Klepinger 1991, 1994 ). This study also evaluated JSA and found shorter unemployment durations for those referred to JSA. However, because in most cases UI benefit receipt ended just before JSA was scheduled, the authors speculate that the shorter durations resulted from an effort to avoid the hassle of JSA rather than as a result of the valuable content of JSA services. 14 effective interventions, a result that supports WPRS and state-adopted ERPs (Klepinger et al. 1998; Johnson and Klepinger 1991; Decker et al. 2000) .
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Results from studies of targeted job search assistance are summarized in Table 7 . Evidence from the New Jersey UI Reemployment Experiment indicates that JSA targeted to dislocated workers at risk of long-term unemployment can be a cost-effective intervention and that the treatment can be very simple and structured; these results led directly to WPRS implementation (Corson et al. 1989) . Statistical targeting of JSA to those at risk of long-term joblessness was tested in the District of Columbia and Florida through field experiments and offered further support for the cost-effectiveness of targeted JSA (Decker et al. 2000) .
Recent evaluations of WPRS indicate shorter jobless durations for program participants (Dickinson et al. 1999 ). An evaluation of WPRS in Kentucky, applying an experimental design, found that WPRS shortens UI duration by more than two weeks (Black et al. 2003) .
All studies evaluating the effectiveness of the PES interventions consistently report low costs per customer served by the public labor exchange. This fact is key to the cost-effectiveness of WIA core services and PES interventions. Even services resulting in a modest reduction in jobless durations show a significant return on public investment when costs are low. Interventions that improve linkages of UI beneficiaries to JSA have the potential to increase the efficiency of state workforce investment systems.
V. CONCLUSIONS
The enforcement of work search requirements and the provision of reemployment services to UI claimants can speed the return to work. With changes in local labor markets that have resulted in more unemployed workers having been permanently laid off without the prospect of recall, there appears to be an increasing need for reasonable work search requirements and available job search assistance.
At Evaluations of the UI work test and JSA summarized in this paper suggest these efforts have tended to shorten insured durations of unemployment. These have been cost-effective policies in the United States. Studies in other countries reach similar findings. A common theme is that despite modest response, the low cost of such interventions mean they tend to yield positive net benefits.
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The UI work test and JSA both affect UI beneficiary behavior and speed return to work.
Initiatives like the REA for reinvigorating the UI work test and studies like the Wisconsin project investigating new linkages for UI beneficiaries to reemployment services both offer real promise for reduced durations of insured unemployment. In turn, such policies should help lower total measured unemployment. 
